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Abstract
The revelation principle has been known in the economics society for decades. In
this paper, I will investigate it from a physical viewpoint, i.e., considering the energy
consumed in performing a mechanism.
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1 Introduction
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in economics theory. Ac-
cording to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
(Page 884, Line 24 [1]): “The implication of the revelation principle is ... to
identify the set of implementable social choice functions, we need only identify
those that are truthfully implementable.”
So far, the revelation principle has been applied to many disciplines such as
auction, contract, the theory of incentives and so on. If we move eyes from eco-
nomics to physics, a common viewpoint is that the world is a physical world,
doing any action requires energy. In this paper, I will investigate the revela-
tion principle from a physical perspective, i.e., studying how much energy is
required for agents and the designer in participating a mechanism. Section 2
and 3 are the main parts of this paper, where I give an energy matrix and
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discuss it further. Section 4 draws conclusions. Related definitions and proofs
are given in Appendix, which are cited from Section 23.B and 23.D [1].
2 An energy matrix
Let us consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i = 1, · · · , I (page 858 [1]).
These agents make a collective choice from some set X of possible alternatives.
Prior to the choice, each agent i privately observes his type θi that determines
his preferences. The set of possible types for agent i is denoted as Θi. The
vector of agents’ types θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) is drawn from set Θ = Θ1 × · · · × ΘI
according to probability density φ(·). Each agent i’s Bernoulli utility function
when he is of type θi is ui(x, θi). A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a
collection of I sets S1, · · · , SI , each Si containing agent i’s possible actions (or
plans of action), and an outcome function g : S → X, where S = S1×· · ·×SI
(page 883, Line 7 [1]).
At first sight, it looks trivial to discriminate the exact format of agent i’s
strategy. Because the two formats of strategies, actions and plans of action,
just correspond to the same results in the traditional theory of mechanism
design. However, from a physical perspective, an action should be viewed
different from a plan of action.
For any agent i, if his strategy si(·) is of an action format, I denote by Ea the
energy required for agent i to choose it (i.e., performing the action). Otherwise
agent i’s strategy si(·) is of a message format (i.e., a plan of action), and I
denote by Em the energy required for agent i to choose it (i.e., selecting the
message). Generally speaking, an action is laborious, to carry out it requires
more energy; whereas a plan of action is a oral message, to select it requires less
energy. This is consistent to the common sense in the real world. Therefore,
it is natural to assume Ea > Em. Note the private type of agent i can also
be represented as a message, because agent i can announce it to the designer.
In addition, I define by Esend and Eg the energy consumed in sending out a
message and performing the outcome function g(·) respectively.
Consider the indirect mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that implements the
social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and the direct reve-
lation mechanism Γdirect = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , h(·)), where h(θ) ≡ g(s∗(θ)), ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Then the revelation principle shows h(·) = f(·), i.e., f(·) is truthfully imple-
mentable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Let us consider two different cases:
Case 1: Γ is oral, in which each agent i’s strategy is of a message format (i.e.,
a plan of action).
1) Performing Γ: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i selects the strategy s∗i (θi) and
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send it to the designer. Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I · (Em +
Esend). The designer receives I messages and perform the outcome function
g(·). Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is Eg.
2) Performing Γdirect: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i announces a type as
a message to the designer. Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I ·
Esend. The designer receives I messages and perform the outcome function
h(·). Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is I · Em + Eg.
Case 2: Γ is laborious, in which each agent i’s strategy is of an action format.
1) Performing Γ: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i performs his action s∗i (θi).
Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I · Ea. The designer perform the
outcome function g(·). Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is Eg.
2) Performing Γdirect: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i announces a type as
a message to the designer. Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I ·
Esend. The designer receives I messages and perform the outcome function
h(·). Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is I · Ea + Eg.
Table 1: The energy matrix of I agents and the designer. The first entry de-
notes the energy of I agents, and the second stands for the energy of the
designer.hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhStrategy format
Mechanism
Γ Γdirect
Oral (a message) [I · (Em + Esend), Eg] [I · Esend, I · Em + Eg]
Laborious (an action) [I · Ea, Eg] [I · Esend, I · Ea + Eg]
Generally speaking, Em, Eg and Esend can be neglected. Then Table 1 is
reduced to Table 2:
Table 2: The simplified energy matrix of I agents and the designer.hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhStrategy format
Mechanism
Γ Γdirect
Oral (a message) [0, 0] [0, 0]
Laborious (an action) [I · Ea, 0] [0, I · Ea]
In terms of computer science, when agents’ strategies are actions instead of
plans of action, the complexity of the energy consumed by the designer in
Γdirect is O(I), which cannot be neglected. Therefore, in order to make the
direct revelation mechanism Γdirect work, an energy condition should be added:
The designer possesses enough energy, at least the sum of energy that all agents
would consume when they participate the original indirect mechanism Γ.
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3 Discussion
In the 1930s, there is a “socialist planning” controversy of historical impor-
tance. According to Page 15, Line 2 [2], “To calculate efficiency prices by
solving the general equilibrium equations, we must gather information about
technology, primary and intermediate resources, and consumers’ preferences,
which are widely dispersed and privately owned by numerous economic agents.
Given the nature and complexity of this privately held information, it would be
prohibitively difficult, if not logically impossible, to motivate numerous private
agents to comply with the request from the central planning board and submit
this information faithfully for the purpose of computing efficiency prices.”
Besides this difficulty, there exists another problem for the designer: In a direct
mechanism Γdirect, does the designer possess enough energy to carry out all
actions that would be done by agents in the original indirect mechanism Γ?
(Generally speaking, there are many factors that may be relevant to agents’
actions, e.g., skill, energy, quality etc. For simplicity, here I only consider one
indispensable factor, i.e., the energy required to carry out an action.)
According to Page 378, the 9th line to the last [3], “... the mechanism designer
is always at an informational disadvantage with respect to the agents, who,
as a collective entity, know more about the true environment that does the
designer”. Based on this idea, it looks somewhat “unreasonable” to assume
that the designer is always at an energy advantage with respect to the agents,
i.e., the designer possesses enough energy that can cover the sum of all agents.
However, the energy problem is totally neglected in the theory of mechanism
design.
As shown before, the energy condition is very weak when the strategy of each
agent i is of a message format. But, when the strategy of each agent i is of an
action format, the energy condition may be restrictive. The designer cannot
take it for granted that he is always able to carry out all actions on behalf of
all agents. When the power of the designer is restricted such that the energy
condition does not hold, the revelation principle will no longer hold.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I propose that if an indirect mechanism is oral (i.e., the strategy
of each agent is of a message format), then there is no problem in the classical
revelation principle. However, if an indirect mechanism is laborious (i.e., the
strategy of each agent is of an action format), then an energy condition should
be added to make the revelation principle hold in the real world.
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Appendix: Definitions in Section 23.B and 23.D [1]
Definition 23.B.1: A social choice function is a function f : Θ1×· · ·×ΘI →
X that, for each possible profile of the agents’ types (θ1, · · · , θI), assigns a
collective choice f(θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ X.
Definition 23.B.3: A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1, · · · , SI and an outcome function g : S1 × · · · × SI → X.
Definition 23.B.5: A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which
Si = Θi for all i and g(θ) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · ×ΘI .
Definition 23.D.1: The strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all i and all
θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(g(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(g(sˆi, s∗−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi]
for all sˆi ∈ Si.
Definition 23.D.2: The mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements the
social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of Γ, s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)), such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 23.D.3: The social choice function f(·) is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if s∗i (θi) = θi (for all θi ∈ Θi and i = 1, · · · , I) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism Γ = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , f(·)).
That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(f(θi, θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(f(θˆi, θ−i), θi)|θi], (23.D.1)
for all θˆi ∈ Θi.
Proposition 23.D.1 (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that im-
plements the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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